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What principles vis-à-vis future generations should govern our pol-
icy choices? Tyler Cowen argues for a “Principle of Growth”: “We should 
make political choices so as to maximize the rate of sustainable economic 
growth.”1 Economic growth means the growth of inclusive gross domestic 
product (GDP), not just marketed goods and services, but also leisure 
time, household production, and environmental amenities.2  
Cowen, as I read him, suggests that the Principle of Growth is jus-
tified by a welfarist, consequentialist moral theory. The core of the argu-
ment is that increasing economic growth both increases average well-
being in future generations, and increases the well-being of the worst off 
in future generations (so there’s a distributive benefit as well).3 He 
worries about the nonconsequentialist moral precepts of common-
sense morality, and suggests that those might be handled through a 
rights constraint, incorporated in a Modified Principle of Growth.4  
I find welfare consequentialism quite plausible, so for purposes of 
this Response I will ignore rights and other nonconsequentialist con-
structs. I want instead to focus on a worry about the Principle of 
Growth that arises within welfare consequentialism.  
Welfare consequentialists say that the moral appropriateness of a 
choice is determined by its possible outcomes, and that the goodness 
of an outcome is determined solely by facts about individual welfare. 
To put this in the language of normative economics, welfare conse-
quentialism says to maximize a social welfare function whose argu-
ments are individual utilities, measuring each individual’s well-being.5 
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 1 Tyler Cowen, Caring about the Distant Future: Why It Matters and What It Means, 74 U 
Chi L Rev 5, 16 (2007).  
 2 See id at 17. 
 3 See id at 18–23. 
 4 Id at 17 (“We should push for sustainable economic growth, but not at the expense of 
inviolable human rights.”).  
 5 See, for example, Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique 
of Risk Assessment, 153 U Pa L Rev 1121, 1183–87 (2005) (explaining welfare consequentialism); 
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Before I explain why welfare consequentialists should worry 
about Cowen’s Principle of Growth, let me make a few preliminary 
points. First, it is important to see that Cowen is not making a Pareto-
dominance argument in the style of Louis Kaplow and Dexter Samida 
and David Weisbach.6 He is not claiming that a policy that increases 
the growth rate can be coupled with intergenerational transfers so 
that everyone in both current and future generations is better off. 
Rather, the claim is that, even if a policy that increases the growth rate 
makes some individuals in the current or near-term generations worse 
off, it is a better policy. To put the point another way, the Principle of 
Growth is offered as a way to choose between Pareto-noncomparable 
allocations of well-being to different generations. 
Second, Cowen suggests that the welfare-consequentialist social 
planner should be time neutral. He should not give less weight to the 
well-being of future individuals per se. Time neutrality, indeed, might 
seem to be the hallmark of any recognizably moral theory about how 
we should act vis-à-vis the future (as opposed to a predictive theory, 
which postulates how the political process will in fact operate, or a 
theory of individual rational choice, which might allow an individual 
to discount his own, and certainly someone else’s, well-being). In fact, 
I am not sure that neutrality regarding future interests is morally un-
challengeable, for two reasons. One involves the problem of infinite 
futures and infinite streams of well-being, which Geoffrey Heal dis-
cusses.7 A second involves “existence” or “nonidentity” problems. If 
some present policy choice brings into existence a future individual—
who would not exist were a different choice to be selected—does her 
well-being count in evaluating the goodness of that choice?8 
However, bracketing infinite welfare streams and existence prob-
lems, I think it is reasonably clear that welfare consequentialism 
should be time neutral. Imagine that the universe has finite spatial 
                                                                                                                           
Matthew D. Adler and Chris W. Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal Applica-
tions, 155 U Pa L Rev 279, 291–96 (2006) (same). 
 6 See Dexter Samida and David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, 74 U 
Chi L Rev 145, 155–60 (2007); Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergen-
erational Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U Chi L Rev 79, 86–87 (2007). Of course, Samida 
and Weisbach and Kaplow advance a Pareto-dominance argument in favor of discounting, not in 
favor of a principle of growth. But the more general point of their articles—I take it—is that, in 
formulating principles for intergenerational policy, we should keep in mind the possibility that 
some policy option coupled with a scheme of intergenerational wealth transfers might be Pareto-
superior to another policy. Cowen, however, is not presenting this sort of argument for the Prin-
ciple of Growth. See Cowen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 22 (cited in note 1) (“Pure Pareto improvements 
are few and far between. So at some level of the analysis, through some method or another, we 
must assert that the benefits to one group of people outweigh the losses to another.”). 
 7 See Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review of the Basic Economics, 74 U Chi L Rev 59, 61–62 
(2007).  
 8 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 351–79 (Oxford 1984).  
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extent, will definitely end, and contains a finite number of individuals 
whose identities are fixed relative to the choice at hand. In that case, 
how could the welfare consequentialist justify giving less weight to the 
interests of future individuals just by virtue of their temporal posi-
tion? Note that a number of the standard arguments for discounting 
pressed by economists do not invoke a pure time preference—a pref-
erence for present over future well-being. Rather, these arguments 
point to opportunity costs; the proposition that future individuals will 
be wealthier (hence have a lower marginal utility of money, so that 
future dollars should be discounted); or uncertainty.9 
A third, and final, preliminary point. In his article, Cowen raises 
the possible concern that increased GDP (even GDP defined in an 
inclusive sense) might not mean increased well-being. What if having a 
larger GDP does not make people happier?10 I am not that worried 
about this issue. Well-being—as I have argued elsewhere—involves 
the satisfaction of self-interested, fully informed preferences.11 The lists 
of objective goods proposed by objectivists about well-being, such as 
Martha Nussbaum’s list—life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other 
species; play; control over one’s environment12—are, in turn, plausibly 
understood as estimates of what self-interested individuals with full 
information would prefer.13 Happiness is one component of well-being, 
but not the sole component.14 Whatever the connection between GDP 
and happiness, it seems very plausible that there is a strong empirical 
connection between a society’s overall GDP and its overall well-being 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
175–76 (Harvard 2006).  
 10 See Cowen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 23–27 (cited in note 1). Cowen ultimately concludes that 
“wealth and happiness commove in the longer run.” Id at 24. But what matters to the welfarist is 
the connection between wealth (GDP) and well-being, not wealth and happiness. My point, in 
this paragraph, is that greater GDP plausibly correlates with greater overall well-being even if it 
doesn’t correlate (or correlate as well) with greater overall happiness. 
 11 See Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 38–39 (cited in note 
9). Strictly, Posner and I argue that well-being consists in the satisfaction of self-interested, ideal-
ized preferences, without taking a position in the debate between full-information accounts of 
idealization and other accounts. I, in fact, find the full-information account particularly plausible. 
In any event, my claim, here, that well-being encompasses more than happiness, and that GDP 
correlates well with overall well-being regardless of its correlation with overall happiness, does 
not depend on the specifics of preference idealization.  
 12 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 
78–80 (Cambridge 2000).  
 13 See, for example, Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 31–32, 
51, 74–75 (cited in note 9); Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist 
Theory of Regulation, 28 Fla St U L Rev 241, 297–99 (2000).  
 14 See Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 28–31, 50 (cited in 
note 9).  
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(or, equivalently, between its per capita GDP and the average well-
being of its members).15 
So why do I worry about the justifiability of Cowen’s Principle of 
Growth within welfare consequentialism? The problem is this: the 
contemporary philosophical literature points to four plausible variants 
of welfare consequentialism, and it’s far from clear that all would un-
derwrite the Principle of Growth. At a minimum, Cowen hasn’t done 
the analytic work to demonstrate that they all would. 
The four variants are:  
1. Utilitarianism. Utilitarians, of course, seek to maximize overall 
well-being. 
2. Prioritarianism. The idea here is to give greater weight to changes 
in well-being that affect individuals who are worse off. The effect 
on the social calculus of a change in some individual’s well-being 
is a function, not just of the size of the change, but also of the in-
dividual’s level of well-being. More technically, prioritarians do 
not sum utilities (as do utilitarians) but sum an increasing con-
cave function of each individual’s utility. (The sum of the square 
root of each individual’s utility would be an example of a priori-
tarian social welfare function.) An equivalent definition is that 
prioritarians maximize a social welfare function which is Paretian 
and equity-regarding in the Pigou-Dalton sense and separable in 
individual utilities. The limiting point of prioritarianism is the 
leximin principle (defined on welfare, not primary goods).16  
3. Comparativism. This maximizes a Paretian social welfare function 
which is equity-regarding in the Pigou-Dalton sense but not sepa-
rable in individual utilities.17  The idea here (nontechnically) is 
that the comparativist is interested in the pattern of welfare levels 
while the prioritarian is not. Consider a policy that, with certainty, 
increases person P’s welfare from fifty to fifty-eight, and de-
                                                                                                                           
 15 I say “empirical connection” because, even if GDP is defined inclusively to take account 
of leisure time, household production, and environmental amenities, it is conceptually possible 
for GDP and overall well-being to diverge. Nussbaum’s list, for example, includes items that 
would not be subsumed by an inclusive GDP measure.  
 16 On prioritarianism, see Adler and Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty at 296–304 
(cited in note 5); Adler and Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis at 56–58 (cited in 
note 9). Leximin ranks two outcomes by comparing the welfare levels of the individuals who are 
worst off in each outcome and picking the outcome where the worst-off individual’s welfare is 
higher—or, if the worst-off individuals are equally well off, comparing the second-to-worst-off 
individuals, then (if these are equal), the third-to-worst-off, and so on. 
 17 See Adler and Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty at 296–304 (cited in note 5).  
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creases Q’s from thirty to twenty-seven, and affects no one else. 
For the utilitarian and the prioritarian, this is all the information 
we need to evaluate the policy. By contrast, comparativists need 
more information. Comparativists evaluate policies by consider-
ing not merely welfare changes and the welfare levels of affected 
individuals (those whose welfares change), but also the welfare 
levels of unaffected individuals. For example, if the social welfare 
function being maximized is the sum of rank-weighted utility—
one kind of comparativist function—the policy will increase social 
welfare if there is one other individual in the population and she 
is worse off than P and Q, but not if her well-being level is in be-
tween P’s and Q’s.18 
4. Sufficientism. The idea here is to give greater weight, or perhaps 
absolute priority, to welfare changes that affect individuals below 
some well-being threshold—call it the poverty line, or the line of 
basic functioning.19 
Utilitarianism corresponds to a specific social welfare function: 
the unweighted sum of utilities. By contrast, prioritarianism, compara-
tivism, and sufficientism each correspond to a distinct family of social 
welfare functions20—each to a different, generic departure from the 
simple utilitarian formula of maximizing overall well-being.  
It is pretty straightforward to see that prioritarian, comparativist, 
and sufficientist social welfare functions need not endorse a policy that 
maximizes economic growth. Consider a very simple example, which 
involves a finite, fixed population—meaning that the total number of 
individuals across time is the same finite amount regardless of which 
policy is picked—and no problems of intragenerational equity or un-
certainty. There are two generations, with F individuals in the first 
generation and S in the second. S > F; the size of the living population 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Imagine that the third individual, M, has utility level m in both cases. If M is worse off 
than both P and Q (in both outcomes), the rank-weighted sum of utilities in the status quo 
equals (3 × m) + (2 × 30) + (1 × 50), and the rank-weighed sum of utilities with the policy equals 
(3 × m) + (2 × 27) + (1 × 58). In this case, the policy is better. By contrast, if M is in between P 
and Q (in both outcomes), then the rank-weighted sum of utilities in the status quo equals  
(3 × 30) + (2 × m) + (1 × 50), and the rank-weighted sum of utilities with the policy is (3 × 27) + 
(2 × m) + (1 × 58). In this case, the status quo is better.  
 19 For a defense of sufficientism, see generally Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Com-
passion, 113 Ethics 745 (2003).  
 20 More precisely, each corresponds to a family of social welfare orderings. An ordering is a 
ranking of outcomes. Some orderings cannot be represented by functions (where a function is a 
mapping from each outcome to a number that represents the place of the outcome in the order-
ing). For example, a leximin ordering of an uncountably infinite set of outcomes cannot be repre-
sented by a function. However, since the term “social welfare function” is more familiar than 
“social welfare ordering,” I use the former term in the text. 
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is growing over time.21 The status quo is zero economic growth.22 Eve-
ryone in the first generation is at utility level ten, and everyone in the 
second generation is at level ten. There’s a policy that produces eco-
nomic growth—at some cost. (Because the Principle of Growth is 
meant to adjudicate between Pareto-noncomparable outcomes, it will, 
inter alia, approve some policies that purchase growth at some cost to 
the current generation.) Let us assume that we can trade a small de-
crease in per capita GDP and average well-being in the first genera-
tion for a substantially larger increase in per capita GDP and average 
well-being in the second generation. In particular, let us assume that 
the growth policy reduces the well-being of each first-generation indi-
vidual to nine, and increases the well-being of each second-generation 
individual to fifteen.  
What will our different social welfare functions say about the policy? 
The utilitarian will approve the policy. Total well-being in the 
status quo is 10F + 10S. Total well-being with the growth policy is 9F + 
15S. Because S > F, the policy increases overall well-being.  
The prioritarian may not approve the growth policy. To begin, re-
gardless of the size of F and S, a leximin social welfare function will 
certainly not approve the growth policy. In the status quo, the worst-
off person is at level ten. With growth, the worst-off person (namely, 
everyone in the first generation) is at level nine. What about less ex-
treme versions of prioritarianism—those that sum an increasing con-
cave function of individual utilities and therefore (by contrast with 
leximin) allow a sufficiently small loss to the welfare of the worst-off 
individual to be compensated by a sufficiently large gain for individu-
als who are better off? Formally, SW(O) = W(Ui), where SW is the 
social welfare function, Ui is the utility of individual i, and W is an in-
creasing concave function. The social value of the status quo equals 
(F × W(10)) + (S × W(10)). The social value of the policy equals  
(F × W(9)) + (S × W(15)). Which is larger depends on the shape of W.23  
                                                                                                                           
 21 Talk of “population change” is ambiguous. In the example at hand, the population is 
temporally variable (the number of individuals in each generation is not the same) but modally 
fixed. The number of individuals at each time, and thus throughout time, is the same in each 
possible world—whether the policy or status quo is chosen. It is modal, not temporal, variation in 
population that leads to puzzles for welfarists—the existence/nonidentity puzzles. 
 22 The growth metric used in this example is the growth of average well-being from gen-
eration to generation. In principle, as mentioned in note 15, average well-being and GDP per 
capita might diverge, but I’m ignoring that possibility here. 
 23 Consider the family of functions W(Ui) = −1 × (Ui)
N, where N < 0. These functions have 
positive first derivatives and negative second derivatives, so are increasing and concave. If N is 
sufficiently close to zero, the growth policy is better than the status quo. But if N is sufficiently 
far from zero, the status quo is better than the growth policy. Consider, for concreteness, the case 
where there are twice the number of individuals in the second generation as in the first: S = 2F. 
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The comparativist may not approve the growth policy. To be sure, 
the growth policy increases total well-being, which grows from 10F + 
10S to 9F + 15S. On the other hand, the policy increases the inequality 
in welfare levels in the intertemporal population—that is the entire 
population of F + S individuals taken as a group. In the status quo, there 
is no gap at all in welfare levels. Everyone in both generations is at level 
ten. With the policy, the gap becomes six. The better-off individuals 
(namely everyone in the second generation) are at level fifteen; the 
worse-off individuals (namely everyone in the first generation) are at 
level nine. The distribution of utilities with the growth policy, (9, 9, 9, 
. . . , 15, 15, 15, . . . ), is certainly a less equal distribution than the distri-
bution of utilities in the status quo, (10, 10, 10, . . . , 10, 10, 10, . . . ), and 
the comparativist might judge that it is worse, all things considered, 
notwithstanding the increase in total well-being. 
Finally, the sufficientist may not approve the growth policy. Let us 
imagine that the threshold, for purposes of the sufficientist theory, is 
just at level ten. Then the growth policy increases overall well-being 
but also increases the number of individuals below the threshold, from 
zero to F. Depending on how the sufficientist trades off below-
threshold and above-threshold utility, she may or may not approve the 
growth policy. Alternatively, imagine that the sufficientist threshold is 
five. In this case, the sufficientist will approve the growth policy, be-
cause it increases overall well-being and the number of below-
threshold individuals is zero both with growth and in the status quo.24 
The lesson of this example, I suggest, is that the justifiability of 
Cowen’s Principle of Growth remains open to question within welfare 
consequentialism, and more generally that the rejection of nonconse-
quentialism and nonwelfarism hardly settles questions of social policy 
vis-à-vis future generations. Even with welfare consequentialism in 
hand, we still need to do the hard, philosophical work of figuring out 
which specific social welfare function policymakers should use. And, if 
the specification of a social welfare function is seen as an irreducibly 
subjective matter, appropriate for legislatures rather than scholars, we 
will need to refer the issue to the political process and await its answer 
before recommending intergenerational policies. Except in the limit-
                                                                                                                           
In this case, if for example N = −5, the growth policy is better. But if, for example, N = −12, the 
status quo is better.  
 24 The standard version of sufficientism stipulates that above-threshold individuals do not 
have egalitarian claims vis-à-vis each other. See Crisp, 113 Ethics at 755 (cited in note 19) (“[W]hen 
people reach a certain level, even if they are worse off than others, benefiting them does not, in 
itself, matter more.”). So, in the limiting case where the number of below-threshold individuals is 
zero regardless of the policy chosen, sufficientism reduces to utilitarianism. 
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ing case where a policy is genuinely Pareto superior25 and debates be-
tween utilitarians, prioritarians, comparativists, and sufficientists can 
be ignored, welfarist intergenerational policymaking depends on the 
shape of the social welfare function.  
This claim does not depend on the unrealistic simplicity of the 
example I have been discussing. The example was chosen to illustrate 
the claim in an accessible and direct way. But it is hard to see why it 
would not be the case that, in more complicated and realistic cases, the 
optimal intertemporal policy choice, given welfare consequentialism, 
will depend on the shape of the social welfare function.  
A second point illustrated by the example is that the welfare con-
sequentialist (at least bracketing nonidentity problems and problems 
of infinite populations) should apply her social welfare function to the 
world’s total intertemporal population, consisting of everyone in the 
first generation plus everyone in the second generation all the way 
through to everyone in the last generation—without reference to the 
identities of the individuals, other nonwelfare information, or their 
position in time. That is, after all, just what welfarism plus time-
neutrality means—or at least how it is most naturally expressed. If 
there are F individuals in the first generation, S in the second genera-
tion and T in the third and last generation, and policymakers at any 
point in time are considering policies, then each possible policy corre-
sponds to a vector of utilities with F + S + T entries, one for each indi-
vidual who exists at some time, whether in the past, the present, or the 
future.26 Policies are chosen by applying the preferred social welfare 
function—utilitarian, prioritarian, comparativist, or sufficientist—to 
these utility vectors. And the social welfare function must be anony-
mous, meaning that reorderings of the same set of numbers must be 
ranked the same.27 That is, (1, 1, 5, 5, 7, 7) must be ranked the same as 
(5, 1, 7, 5, 7, 1), and so forth. The crucial point about this formalism is 
that the only information about a given individual that influences the 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Meaning that some individuals in some generations are better off and no one is worse 
off. Although it is possible to marry welfarism and non-Paretianism, the arguments for the 
Pareto principle are very strong and I therefore assume that any plausible social welfare function 
will approve a Pareto-superior outcome. See Adler and Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty at 
293–94 (cited in note 5).  
 26 This ignores uncertainty, and assumes that each policy corresponds to a particular out-
come—a particular vector of utilities with F + S + T entries. Given uncertainty, each policy corre-
sponds to a set of possible outcomes—to a set of possible utility vectors, each with F + S + T 
entries. See id at 304–09.  
 27 On “anonymous” or, equivalently, “symmetric” social welfare functions, see id at 294.  
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social welfare function is his well-being. His name, other nonwelfare 
information, and his position in time are all washed out.28  
This welfarist and temporally neutral way of conceptualizing pol-
icy choice undermines Cowen’s suggestion that nonutilitarians should 
approve the Principle of Growth because greater growth makes poor 
individuals in the future better off than they would be with less 
growth.29 Even if that is true, the issue for the nonutilitarian, given 
time neutrality, is the distribution of welfare levels throughout time, 
not merely the distribution in the future. For example, if the policy-
maker employs a leximin function, she should lump all the generations 
together, identify the individual who is worst off in that combined 
population given each policy, and choose the policy that maximizes 
that individual’s welfare level. If the policymaker’s view is comparativ-
ist, then she should lump all the generations together and consider the 
pattern of utilities in that combined population associated with each 
policy. Increased economic growth can improve the position of badly-
off individuals in future generations, but increased growth can also 
reduce the position of badly-off individuals right now; it can increase 
the gap between our welfare and the welfare of future generations; 
and it may in principle increase, rather than decrease, the extent to 
which people fall below “sufficientist” thresholds, depending on where 
those are set. 
                                                                                                                           
 28 It might be objected that nonutilitarians would care about the social position of indi-
viduals. Individuals in the same society have stronger redistributive claims on each other than on 
individuals in a different society—or so it might be thought. But that view amounts to a kind of 
nonwelfarism, and in any event doesn’t argue for taking each generation as a unit (since mem-
bers of different generations can be part of the same society, and members of the same genera-
tion can be part of different societies), or for other sorts of departures from time-neutrality. 
 29 See Cowen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 21 (cited in note 1). 
